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LAISSEZ FAIRE, SUGAR AND SLAVERY 1

I

N the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Britain’s sugar
colonies were the favored plantations of the Empire.
By the middle of the nineteenth century they had be

come nuisances.

The history of that decline has been written,

too narrowly, from the standpoint of the humanitarian attack
on Negro slavery.

The weakness of the West Indian system

was less that it was immoral than that it was unprofitable.2
The attack on West Indian slavery was in a larger sense only
a part of the general attack on monopoly and imperialism
which characterized the transition of English economy from
mercantilism to laissez faire.

The rise and fall of slavery was

a phase of the rise and fall of mercantilism.

India and Brazil
In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the West Indian
colonies had a practical monopoly of sugar cultivation.
golden age came to an end in the nineteenth century.

The

Ersatz,

in the form of beet sugar, gained its first great victory as a
result of the British blockade of France during the Napoleonic
War.

Brazil, India, Mauritius, Cuba forged ahead, and sugar

cultivation was later extended to Louisiana, Australia, Hawaii,
the Philippines and Java.

Overproduction, the curse of the

twentieth century, had arrived.
The British sugar planters succumbed to this competition.
In 1788 they were outdistanced by Saint-Domingue (Haiti) ;
in 1820 by Mauritius; in 1830 by Brazil.

Within the Empire

itself Barbados had yielded to Jamaica in the eighteenth cen
tury, and Jamaica to Trinidad and British Guiana in the early
1
This essay is part of a general thesis, to be published shortly, on “ Capital
ism and Slavery ”. Much of the research involved was facilitated by a Julius
Rosenwald Fellowship, 1940-1941.
2 Liverpool Papers (British Museum), Add. Mss. 38295, f. 102.
mous writer to Lord Bexley, July 1823.
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The fortunes of the British West Indies illustrated

the law of slave production, namely, that slavery, granted a
paucity of labor and an unlimited extent of fertile soil, was
cheaper than free labor— on one condition: the slave power
required ever fresh conquests.

For this reason slavery con

tinued to be profitable and cheaper than free labor, in a large
island like Cuba or in an empire like Brazil, long after the
“ land-killer ” , as the planter was called in the picturesque
nomenclature of the South, had exhausted its possibilities in
Barbados or Jamaica.
A s markets the British West Indies had declined.

In 1814

they took one sixth of all British exports, in 1833 only one
fourteenth.3

British exports to India and China, on the other

hand, quadrupled between 1814 and 1832; 4 those to Brazil
increased nearly three times between 1821 and 1833, and more
than

doubled again between

1835

and

1854.5

Only

one

obstacle stood in the way of the increase of this trade with
these two important markets— the returns they could make.
British tariff legislation had banned India’s exports of cotton
goods to England and made the Indian market safe for Lan
cashire goods.

India could not compete with the United States

as a supplier of raw cotton.

The Indian traders had therefore

to choose between sugar and the sands of the Ganges for re
turn cargoes.

They chose sugar, to which Prime Minister

Pitt had turned his attention as early as 1790 in an attempt to
capture the European sugar market from France.6
A similar difficulty faced British capitalists in their relations
with Brazil.

Approximately three eighths of the sugar, one

half of the coffee, and five eighths of the cotton exports from
Pernambuco, Rio de Janeiro and Bahia were shipped on British
3 W . L . B u rn , E m a n c i p a t i o n a n d A p p r e n t i c e s h i p i n t h e B r i t i s h
(L o n d o n , 19 3 7 ), p.

4 C u sto m s
5I b id .,

8

v o ls.

W est In d ie s

100.

(Public Record Office), vols. 2 and 35.
14 an d

( C h a p e l H i ll , 1 9 3 3 ) , p .

38;
322.

A. K.

M a n c h e ste r, B r i t i s h

P r e e m in e n c e

in

6 L . J . R a g a t z , T h e F a l l o f t h e P l a n t e r C l a s s in t h e B r i t i s h C a r i b b e a n

York, 1928), pp. 211, 213-214.

B r a z il

(N ew

No. i]

LAISSEZ F A IR E , SUGAR AND S LA V E R Y

69

accounts, but, except for cotton, very little of these products was
annually landed in England.7
In both cases the obstacle was the British West Indian
monopoly of the British sugar market.

The interests of British

capitalism inexorably demanded the abolition of the West In
dian monopoly.
tarianism?

What of the interests of British humani-

They just as inexorably demanded the perpetua

tion of that monopoly.
had been

For, after 1833, the stigma of slavery

removed from

British West

Indian production.

Brazil and Cuba were clearly slave communities which, in
addition to employing slave labor, still conducted the slave
trade.

A ny equalization of the sugar duties would therefore

be a stimulus to slavery in those countries.
What, then, of India?

The act emancipating the slaves in

the British West Indies passed its third reading on August 7,
1833.

Forty-eight hours before, the East India Charter had

come up for renewal in the House of Lords.

The bill included

a clause which declared that slavery “ should be abolished ” in
India.

Lord Ellenborough expressed his astonishment that

such a proposition should ever have entered the head of any
statesman.

Lord Auckland defended the b ill: “ it had been

framed with the utmost caution consistent with the destruction
of an odious system; as well as the utmost care not to interfere
with the domestic manners of the natives.”

The Duke of

Wellington called it a violent innovation, altogether uncalled
for, which would produce the greatest dissatisfaction, if not
absolute insurrection.8
Repeated declarations were later made in Parliament on
behalf of the government that the East India Company was
preparing legislation with a view to the “ amelioration ” of
slavery and that such legislation would be tabled in Parliament.
But the promised legislation never was tabled.

In defense of

the East Indians it was pleaded, in 1842, that they had pro
hibited the selling of children into slavery in periods of
7 Manchester,

o p . c it .,

p. 315.

8 Hansard, P a r l i a m e n t a r y D e b a t e s , Third Series, XX, 315, 323, 324, August 5,
1833; P, A u g u s t 9, 1833.
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Ten years after Britain's “ great atonement" the

Earl of Auckland would not deny that “ some condition of
servitude, more or less painful, might not still exist " ; 10 and
Peel considered that such measures as had been adopted “ ap
peared well calculated to arrest the progress of slavery, and
check abuses, and when carried out in all parts of India under
our control, or which we could influence, would go a long way
to suppress slavery." 11

The Capitalists
In the front ranks of the attack on the West Indians were
the industrial capitalists— cotton manufacturers, sugar refiners,
shipowners.
1833.

They had voted against West Indian slavery in

“ Relief from this monopoly ", said a sugar refiner,

“ would be cheaply purchased by granting the West India
proprietors the full amount of the compensation proposed." 12
The capitalists had even demanded the admission of Brazilian
sugar, not for consumption but for refining and re-export.
This was parliamentary strategy.

They were interested in

cheap sugar, not free-grown sugar, and in 1836 they came out
brazenly for the unrestricted importation of all sugar, irre
spective of origin or method of production.
They based their arguments on the ground that the protect
ing duty forced their laborers to pay higher prices for sugar
and so took away from them the money earned in the fac
tories.13

They

called the protecting

duty

an

“ obnoxious

tax ",14 which cost England more than the value of British
exports to the islands.15

The West Indian did not pay a

farthing more for a bale of British calicoes than his Brazilian
rival, so of what value was the system of monopoly to British
manufacturers? 16
9 Hansard, Third Series, LXV, 1075, Baring, Aug. 5, 1842.
10 I b i d . , LXX, 1294, July 21, 1843.
V I b id .,

LXVIII, 753, April 10, 1843.

12 I b i d . ,

XVIII, 589, Clay, June 11, 1833.

13 I b i d . ,

C, 54, Milner Gibson, July 3, 1848.

14 I b i d . , LXXVII, 1053, Gibson, Feb. 24, 1845.

15 I b i d . , LXXV, 444, Villiers, June 10, 1844.
16Ibid., LXXVII, 1061-1062, Gibson, Feb. 24, 1845.
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To the capitalists the distinction between free-grown and
slave-grown produce was humbug.

Britain depended for her

very existence on the slave-grown cotton of the United States.
The government had abolished all duties on cotton; it had
reduced the duty on Brazilian slave-grown coffee and Cuban
ores worked by slave labor.

The British Parliament saw

slavery only where it saw sugar; its humanity was bounded by
the circumference of a hogshead.17

British legislators framed

their tariff on grounds of morality, they erected a pulpit in
every custom house and made their landing-waiters enforce
anti-slavery doctrines.18 They tried things by a thermometer of
their own; it rose to boiling point on Cuban sugar, but sank to
a most agreeable temperature on Carolina cotton.19
The situation was farcical.

Cobden wrote a skit on it in the

form of an imaginary interview at the Board of Trade between
Lord Ripon and the Brazilian Ambassador.

The Ambassador

taunts the embarrassed Englishman:
No religious scruples against sending slave-grown cotton into
every country in the world? No religious scruples against eat
ing slave-grown rice? No religious scruples against smoking
slave-grown tobacco? No religious scruples against taking
slave-grown snuff? . . . Am I to understand that the religious
scruples of the English people are confined to the article of
sugar ?
Ripon, obviously uncomfortable, reiterates his inability to take
Brazilian sugar, and pleads, in defense, the promptings of the
Anti-Slavery faction led by Joseph Sturge.

A t this moment

in walks Sturge, with a cotton cravat, his hat lined with calico,
his coat sewn with cotton thread, his pockets well lined with
slave-wrought gold and silver.

The two diplomats burst into

laughter.20
Even with regard to sugar the British were inconsistent.

In

1845 British ships conveyed 24,000 tons of slave-grown sugar
17 Hansard, Third Series, XCIX, 1223, G. Thompson, June 26, 1848.
18 I b i d . , LXXV, 170, Russell, June 3, 1844.
78 I b i d . , LXXXVIII, 517, Lansdowne, Aug. 10, 1846.
20

J. E. Ritchie,

18 6 7), I I I ,

743- 744.

T h e L i f e a n d T im e s o f V is c o u n t P a lm e r s to n

(London, 1866-

[V ol.

POLITICAL SCIENCE Q U A R TE R L Y

72

from Rio de Janeiro alone.21

LVIII

It was this same “ lucrative

humanity ” which had provoked smiles at the Congress of
Vienna in 1815, when Britain had tried to persuade the Central
Powers of Europe to boycott in their dominions the slave
produce of Brazil and Cuba which she herself transported to
Europe.22

Britain took the slave sugar of Louisiana, arguing

a reciprocity treaty with the United States, but when Spain,
basing her claim on an ancient treaty, demanded most favored
nation treatment for her colonial sugar, Britain refused.
The capitalists saw in this nothing but an attempt to defend
the West Indian monopoly.

It was injustice and folly, in

their opinion, to impose protective duties on food.23

Monopoly

was unsound, costly to all, and had destroyed the great empires
of the past.24

Protection was an opiate which enervated and

paralyzed the planters, making them everlasting grumblers,
like Oliver Twist, always asking for more.25

Defeated time

and again, the free traders, as Bright warned, returned to the
charge with renewed energy.26

Ricardo advised the planters

that “ the ball was rolling, and nothing that they could do
would suffice to stop it.” 27

Bright called them impudent, re

minded them tartly that it was not the duty of Parliament to
make sugar cultivation profitable, and advised them to grow
cloves and nutmegs.28
Ever since 1814 the British government, under abolition
pressure, had been committed to a policy of suppressing the
slave trade.

It had established a squadron on the African

coast to deter or capture the slavers.

But the British govern-

21 Hansard, Third Series, LXXXVIII, 517, Lansdowne, Aug. 10, 1846.

Some Official Correspondence of George Canning

22 E. J. Stapleton (ed.),
(London, 1887), I, 62. Memorandum for the Cabinet, Nov. 15, 1822.
23 Hansard, Third Series, LVII, 920, Villiers, April 5, 1841.

24Ibid., LVII, 162-163, Labouchere, March 12, 1841.
25 Ibid., LXXVII, 1144, Bright, Feb. 24, 1845; ibid., 1066, Ewart, Feb. 24,
1845;

ibid.,

XCIX, 1428, Bright, June 30, 1848.

23Ibid., LXXVIII, 930, March 14,-1845.

27 I b i d . ,
28 Ibid.,
30, 1848.

L X X V II,

1078, F e b . 24, 1845.

LXXVI, 37, June 27, 1844; XCIX, 747, 1420, June 16 and June
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British goods, from Manchester and

Liverpool— cottons, fetters and shackles— were sent direct to
the coast of Africa or indirectly to Rio de Janeiro and Havana,
where they were used by their Brazilian and Cuban consignees
for the purpose of purchasing slaves.29

In 1845 Peel refused

to contradict the fact that British subjects were engaged in the
slave trade.30

The Liverpool representative in Parliament,

questioned point blank, would not deny that Liverpool exports
to Africa or elsewhere were not appropriated to “ some im
proper purpose".31

John Bright was well aware of the in

terests of his Lancashire constituents when he argued elo
quently in 1843 against a bill prohibiting the employment of
British capital, however indirectly, in the slave trade on the
ground that it would be a dead letter, and that the matter should
be left to the honorable and moral feelings of individuals.32
The economy of Brazil and Cuba depended upon the slave
trade; hence the British capitalists opposed the policy of sup
pression.

Commerce was the great emancipator.

slave trade alone, it would commit suicide.

Leave the

If the miscreants

of any nation chose to engage in it, their guilt be upon their
own heads; leave to a higher tribunal the moral government of
the world.33

Bright criticized as audacity the idea that justice

to Africa should be done at the expense of injustice to E n g
land.34

They had a great deal to do at home, argued Cobden,

within a stone's throw of where they were, before they em
barked on a scheme of redeeming from barbarism the whole
coast of Africa.35

There were other occasions on which to

devote attention to the social happiness of the world, other
means of endeavoring to advance that happiness, and they
should not interfere violently by fiscal regulations with the
29 Hansard, Third Series, LIX, 609, Brougham, Sept. 20, 1841.

30Ibid., XCVI, 1095. Quoted by Hutt, Feb. 22, 1848.
31 Ibid., XCVIII, 1198, Cardwell, May 18, 1848.
32Ibid., LXXI, 941, Aug. 18, 1843.
33I b i d . , XCVI, 1100, Hutt, Feb. 22, 1848.
34Ibid., XCIX, 748, June 16, 1848.

35 Ibid.,

CXIII, 40, July 19, 1850.
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Britain's “ blundering and ignorant hu

manity " had only aggravated the sufferings of the slaves.

The

slave trade was on the increase, and not all the forces of the
British Navy, not all the resources of the British Treasury
could suppress it.37

Had the British governments surrendered

their reason to philanthropy?38

Had they prostituted their

diplomacy to the purposes of an unreasonable fanaticism?39
Was it not curious to see governments, not distinguished by
devotion to constitutional liberties at home, assuming that a
distant and barbarous people had more claims on their con
science than their own countrymen? 40
Mercantilism meant colonies.

The West Indies were only

the most precious of the colonies in the eighteenth century.
“ He should

ever

consider",

said

Chatham,

“ the

sugar

colonies as the landed interest of this kingdom, and it was a
barbarism to consider them otherwise." 41
era the West Indies had fallen from grace.

In the free trade
“ Jamaica to the

bottom of the sea," said Roebuck, “ and all the Antilles after
it."

These “ barren " colonies had ever been “ the most fatal

appendages " of the Empire, and if they were to be blotted out
from the face of the earth Britain would lose not “ one jot of
her strength, one penny of her wealth, one instrument of her
power." 42
The capitalists in fact wanted no colonies.

Adam Smith had

written against the colonial connection and Arthur Young
called the colonies nuisances.

To Cobden they were expensive

encumbrances, making dazzling appeals to the passions of the
people, serving but as “ gorgeous and ponderous appendages
36 Hansard, Third Series, LXXV, 170, Russell, June 3, 1844.

37 Ibid.,

XCVI, 1092, 1096, 1101, Hutt, Feb. 22, 1848.

38Ibid., XCVII, 986-987, Urquhart, March 24, 1848.

39 Ibid.,

Cl, 177, Urquhart, Aug. 16, 1848.

40Ibid., LXXXI, 1156, 1158, Hutt, June 24, 1845.
41 Quoted in R. Pares,
ford, 1936), p. 509-

War and Trade in the West Indies, i739~I7^)3

42 Hansard, Third Series, LXIII, 1218-1219, June 3, 1842;
462, June 10, 1844.

ibid.,

(Ox

LXXV,
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to swell our ostensible grandeur, but, in reality, to complicate
and magnify our government expenditure, without improving
our balance of trade.”

He could see nothing but a “ monstrous

impolicy ” in “ sacrificing our trade with a new continent, of
almost boundless extent of rich territory, in favour of a few
small islands, with comparatively exhausted soils.” 43
The Navigation Laws, regarded in the mercantilist era as
the very keystone of the imperial arch, were now, in the age of
laissez faire, swept away by the full tide of anti-colonial senti
ment as the lumber of former times.

When corn and sugar

were on the run, shipping could enjoy no immunity.

Ricardo

advised the advocates of the “ long voyage ” to practice sea
manship by sailing their cargo three times around the British
Isles.44

The Abolitionists
The story of the great humanitarian crusade has been fre
quently told and as frequently misunderstood.

In one of the

greatest propaganda movements of all times, the abolitionists
had, before 1833, gone far beyond the bounds of British West
Indian slavery.

They had dreamed of the universal abolition

of slavery and the slave trade.

They had lobbied at the Euro

pean Congresses from 1815 to 1820 in favor of an international
ban on the slave trade, and were even prepared to go to war
for abolition.
nize

Brazil

They had urged the government not to recog
without an explicit promise to renounce the

slave trade.45
Actually, however, their condemnation of slavery applied
only to the Negro and only to the Negro in the British West
Indies.

A s an apology for the East India Company, Zachary

Macaulay urged that “ they had obtained dominion over coun
tries which had been previously under the Hindoo and Mogul
43 I b i d . , CXV, 1443, April 10, 1851;
(London, 1878), pp. 12, 14.

The

P o litic a l

W r itin g s

of

R ic h a r d

o n B r itis h

C o lo n ia l

C ohden

44 K. N. Bell and W. P. Morrell (eds.), S e l e c t D o c u m e n t s
(Oxford, 1928), Introduction, p. xli.

P o lic y , 18 3 0 -18 6 0

45 D e s p a t c h e s ,

C orresp on d en ce

D u k e o f W e llin g to n

and

M em oranda

of

F ie ld

M arsh al

(London, 1867-1880), I, 474-475, Oct. 31, 1822.

A rth u r,
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They therefore could not be blamed if, when

they came into possession of those countries, they found prin
ciples acted upon with which, however adverse to their feelings,
it would be unsafe to interfere, without due caution/’ 46

In

1837 Buxton expressed the fear that sugar would produce a
system of slavery in the East as disgraceful as it had produced
in the West.
not.

The government spokesman assured him it would

Buxton “ was much obliged . . . for that assurance.” 47

In 1843 Brougham, veteran abolitionist, was still looking for
ward with sanguine hope to the abolition of slavery in India,
“ a consummation not to be accomplished so much by legisla
tion, or by doing violence to property ” , as by encouraging the
native slaveowners to declare their children free after a certain
date.48

Yet it was the sugar of this country that the aboli

tionists urged upon the people of England in preference to the
slave-grown sugar of the West Indies.

Some of the aboli

tionists had East Indian interests, and “ perhaps their detesta
tion of West Indian slavery was sharpened by a sense of the
unfair discrimination of the sugar duties in favour of the West
Indies and against the growing sugar plantations of India.” 49
Thomas Whitmore, East Indian leader in Parliament, was a
Vice President of the Anti-Slavery Society, and a candidate
for the succession to the leadership of the Anti-Slavery Party.
Zachary Macaulay had shares in the East India Company.
James Cropper, one of the most active of the abolitionists, who
had been the first to import the slave-grown cotton of America,
was the greatest importer of East India sugar into Liverpool.
The abolitionists were equally silent about American slavery
which supplied England’s factories with their vital raw supply.
The West Indian could legitimately ask whether “ slavery was
only reprehensible in countries to which those members do not
46
ig th

p.

D e b a te s
and

21st

at th e

M arch

G e n e r a l C o u r t o f P r o p r ie to r s o f E a s t I n d ia
18 2 3

on

th e

E a st

In d ia

Sugar

Trade

35 .
4? Hansard, Third Series, XXXVIII,

18 53 -18 54 , J u ly 10, 1837.

48 I b i d . , LXX, 1294, July 21, 1843.
49 Bell and Morrell,

o p . c it .t

Introduction, p. xxx.

S to ck

on

(London, 1833),

th e
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trade, and where their connections do not reside.” 50
abolitionists made curious replies.

The

The person who received

slave-grown produce from America dealt in the produce of
labor performed by slaves who were not his fellow subjects,
and there was not, in the slavery of the United States, any
evidence of that destruction of human life which was one of
the most appalling features of the system in the British West
Indies.51

The boycotters of West Indian sugar sat upon chairs

of Cuban mahogany, before desks of Brazilian rosewood, used
inkstands of slave-grown ebony, and wrote on paper partly
made of slave-grown cotton; but “ it would do no good to go
round and inquire into the pedigree of every chair and table.” 52
As the Newcastle abolitionists argued, only “ the unnecessary
purchase of one iota of slave produce involves the purchaser in
the guilt of the slaveholder.” 53
The acid test for the abolitionists after 1833 came over two
questions: the suppression of the slave trade and free trade in
sugar.

Buxton condemned the slave squadron and the policy

of forcible suppression as causing aggravated suffering to
multiplied numbers.54

Sturge reorganized the Anti-Slavery

Society on a purely pacific basis.

“ The utter failure ” , said

James Wilberforce, Junior, Bishop of Oxford, at a great aboli
tionist meeting in 1840, “ of every attempt by treaty, by remon
strance, and by naval armaments to arrest the progress of the
slave trade, proves the necessity of resorting to a preventive
policy founded on different and higher principles.” 55

Buxton,

fils, “ could not but see that those high principles by which
this country had been guided for many years were now sup
planted by others which, though important in themselves, were

The Liverpool Mercury and Lancashire General Advertiser , July 27» 1832.
61 Ibid., August 24, 1832.
52 The Tariff of Conscience, Free Trade in Slave Produce Considered and
Condemned (Newcastle Anti-Slavery Series, n.d., in John Rylands Library,
50

Manchester).

53 Conscience

versus Cotton; or, the Preference of Free Labour Produce

(Newcastle Anti-Slavery Series, n.d.).
54 Hansard, Third Series, LXXXI, 1159.

56

Ibid.,

CIX, 1098.

Quoted by Hutt, June 24, 1845.

Quoted by Hutt, March 19, 1850.
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far inferior to those principles on which he had acted in former
years.” 56

Brougham's

philanthropy

was

excited

only

by

sugar and not by cotton, only by the slave trade and not by
slavery, only by the slave trade between Africa and Brazil and
not by the slave trade between Virginia and Texas.

He con

demned as “ a gross perversion of the doctrines of free trade ”
the policy of obtaining cheap sugar “ at the heavier cost of
piracy and torture, and blood.”

According to his interpreta

tion the United- States did not carry on the slave trade; there
was a difference between slave-grown sugar in Louisiana, in
creased by the natural increase of the slaves or more efficient
cultivation, and slave-grown sugar in Brazil, increased by “ the
unnatural, forced, and infernal traffic in Africans carried on
by force and fraud.” 57
Perhaps the greatest speech ever made on the slavery ques
tion was the speech of Thomas Babington Macaulay in 1845.
It was a masterpiece of clarity and lucidity, befitting a great
historian, but it was pro-slavery.

“ My especial obligations ” ,

said Macaulay with asperity, “ in respect of negro slavery
ceased when slavery itself ceased in that part of the world for
the welfare of which I, as a member of this House, was ac
countable.”

He saw himself under no obligation to turn their

fiscal code into a penal code for the purpose of correcting vices
in the institutions of independent states, or their tariff into “ an
instrument for rewarding the justice and humanity of some
governments, and for punishing the barbarity of others.”

He

boldly faced the inconsistency of importing Brazilian sugar for
refining but not for consumption.
We import the accursed thing; we bond it; we employ our skill
and machinery to render it more alluring to the eye and to the
palate; we export it to Leghorn and Hamburg; we send it to
all the coffee houses of Italy and Germany; we pocket a profit
on all this; and then we put on a Pharisaical air, and thank
God that we are not like those sinful Italians and Germans
who have no scruple about swallowing slave-grown sugar. . . .
56 Hansard, Third Series, XCIX, 849, June 19, 1848.

57 I b i d . , CXXXIX, 116, June 26, 1855;

ib id .,

CL, 2205, June 17, 1858.
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I will not have two standards of right. . . . I will not have
two weights or two measures. I will not blow hot and cold,
play fast and loose, strain at a gnat, and swallow a camel.58
Clarkson, the grand old man of the abolitionist movement,
was now behind the times.

In 1840 he was still looking to the

East India Company for the achievement of his aim of ex
tirpating slavery from the whole world, “ by means that are
perfectly moral and pacific, according to your own principles,
namely, by the cultivation of the earth and by the employment
of free l a b o u r 59

In 1846 Clarkson sent a petition to the

House of Lords, calling for the exclusion of all products raised
by fettered and manacled hands.60

Once he had been a voice

crying in the wilderness, now he was nothing but the shadow
of a mighty name.
A new attitude toward slavery had developed.

Mr. Wilson

was not prepared to say that, because the relation between em
ployer and employed was that of master and slave, it should
be branded as injustice and oppression.61

The member for

Oxford University opposed the slave trade and was prepared
for war, if necessary, to suppress it, but he had never accepted
the view that property in man was illegal.62

The political

economist, J. R. McCulloch, warned that without slavery the
tropics could never have been cultivated and that, as an insti
tution, it was not justly open to the opprobrium and denuncia
tion heaped on it.63

Look at the system of slavery more

calmly, lectured Professor Merivale at Oxford; it was a great
social evil, but one differing in degree and quality, not in kind,
from many other social evils they were compelled to tolerate,
such as the great inequality of fortunes, pauperism, or the over58Ibid., LXXVII, 1290, 1292, 1300, 1302, Feb. 26, 1845.
59 Clarkson Papers (British Museum), Add. Mss. 41267A, ff. 178-179.
60 Hansard, Third Series, LXXXVIII, 4-5, July 27, 1846.

«1 Ibid.,

XCVI, 85, Feb.

62 Ibid.,

L, 131, Inglis, Aug. 8, 1839;

4,

1848.

ibid.,

XCIX, 1324, June 29, 1848.

83Ibid., LXXXVIII, 163. Quoted by Disraeli, July 28, 1846.
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working of children.64
Denman,

had

LVIII

Public opinion, in the words of Lord

undergone

a

“ lamentable

and

disgraceful

change.” 65

The West India Interest
Against the combined attacks of capitalists and abolitionists
the West India interest put up a stubborn fight.

If, however,

the antagonists were the same as in the previous conflicts over
abolition and emancipation, they had changed ideologies in
the interim.

The former slaveowners were now the great

advocates of humanitarianism and free labor.

Those who

formerly had countenanced slavery in the British colonies were
now the most zealous critics of slavery in the foreign colonies.
Where formerly, as owners of slaves, they had demanded pro
tection against the free-grown sugar of India, now, employers
of free labor, they demanded it against the slave-grown sugar
of Brazil.

Formerly they had extenuated the evils of sugar

cultivation by slaves, now they exaggerated them.

When they

employed slaves they apologized for the evils of slavery; now
that they employed freemen they exalted the blessings of
freedom.
They depended on three things to save them, protection,
labor and the abolition of the slave trade.

To them protection

was simply a claim for justice.66

refuse it was un-

English.67

To

The protecting duty was necessary to safeguard

the experiment of free labor (paid at twenty-five cents a day)
from the advantages of Brazil and Cuba.68
ever, need this duty?

Did India, how

Or did Barbados, with its 750 persons

to the square mile, crying out for “ living space ” ?
The planters continued to demand labor as if they were still
living in the palmy days of the slave trade.
64 H. Merivale,
1861), p. 303.

Lectures on Colonization and Colonies,

Portuguese,

18 3 9 -18 4 1

( London,

65 Hansard, Third Series, XCVI, 1052, Feb. 22, 1848.

66 Ibid. ,
67 Ibid.,
23, 1848.

C, 356, Bentinck, July 10, 1848.
LXXV, 213, Stewart, June 3, 1844;

68Ibid., LVI, 616, Sandon, Feb. 12, 1841.

ibid.,

XCIX, 1094, Miles, June
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Africans, convicts— anything would do.

But the great source

was India, as Africa had been before emancipation.

Between

1838 and 1917 approximately 238,000 Indians were imported
into British Guiana and 145,000 into Trinidad.69

Unrestricted

Indian immigration was the appeasement offered to the planters
in return for the equalization of the duties.
Thereafter the West Indians turned their attention to the
third of their trinity, the foreign slave trade.

They had called

for its abolition ever since 1807 and had sent special emissaries
to England in 1830 to impress upon the government this in
dispensable prerequisite of British West Indian recovery.70

A

movement of considerable proportions developed in Jamaica in
1849 along these lines.

A ll classes, colors, parties and sects

presented a united front; laymen and churchmen, planters and
laborers, former slaveowners and emancipated slaves, whites
and blacks joined in the cry of justice to Africa, that “ the
odious term ‘ slave ' [be] expunged from the vocabulary of
the universe.,, 71

In 1807 the agent for Jamaica in England

had lugubriously prophesied that abolition of the British slave
trade would “ occasion diminished commerce, diminished rev
enue and diminished navigation; and in the end sap and totally
remove the great cornerstone of British prosperity.” 72
1849

In

African slave trade and slavery were denounced in

Jamaica as “ opposed to humanity— productive of the worst evils
to Africa— degrading to all engaged in the traffic, and inimical
to the moral and spiritual interests of the enslaved.” 73

International Migrations

69 I. Ferenczi,
(New York, 1929).
mated from tables in vol. 1, pp. 506-509, 516-518, 520.

of

Figures esti

Sess. Papers Accounts and Papers,

70 H .
C.
,
1 8 3 0 - 1 8 3 1 , vol. IX, No. 120,
p. 84. Keith Douglas to the Board of Trade, Oct. 30, 1830; C. 0 . 137/186,
Memorial of Jamaica deputies, Nov. 29, 1832.
71 D. Turnbull, The Jamaica Movement, for Promoting the Enforcement o f
the Slave-Trade Treaties, and the Suppression of the Slave Trade (London,
1850), especially pp. 65, 94, 95, 99, 120, 201, 267.
72 “ The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at Dropmore” (His
torical Manuscripts Commission, London, 1892-1927), IX, 14-19. Edmund Lyon
to Grenville, Jan. 16, 1807.
73 Turnbull,

o p . c it .f

p. 202.
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Gladstone
Sugar was a question of enormous complexity, involving
not merely the simple issue of protection or free trade, as in the
case of corn, but the more thorny one of free labor and slave
labor.

Its difficulties have been followed by a consideration of

the attitudes of the major interests involved.

These can further

be illustrated by a consideration of the attitudes of England's
three leading statesmen: Gladstone, Disraeli and Palmerston.
Gladstone was a West Indian.

His father owned extensive

sugar plantations in British Guiana and was at one time chair
man of the Liverpool West India Association, while he was
also one of the first private traders to venture into the Indian
field.

The great statesman was therefore well fitted to defend

the joint West-East Indian sugar monopoly after 1836.

His

maiden speech in Parliament had been a defense of the slavery
on his father's plantations.

A ll his filial feelings, taunted

an opponent, were involved in the question of slavery, and his
family connections with West Indian sugar plantations brought
out all his eloquence.74
The free trader of later years was at that time a protec
tionist in sugar.

But he could not defend the East Indian

claim for protection,75 and he was forced to admit that the
distinction between free-grown and slave-grown sugar was not
so clear that it could be drawn with uniform and absolute
precision.76

In 1841 he openly supported the policy of sup

pression of the slave trade, refusing “ for small and paltry
pecuniary advantages. . . to forgo the high title and noble
character they had earned before the whole world ", or “ to
substitute an uniformity in wrong for an inconsistent acknowl
edgment of what was right." 77

Nine years later the suppres

sion policy appeared to him anomalous and preposterous: “ it
is not an ordinance of Providence that the government of one
74 Hansard, Third Series, LXXVIII, 469, Bright, March 7, 1845.

75 Ibid.,

CXI, 581, May 31, 1850.

7 * I b id .,

LXXVII, 1269, Feb. 26, 1845.

77

I bid.,

LVIII, 167, 169, May 10, 1841.
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nation shall correct the morals of another/' 78

And it was

Gladstone who led the campaign in England for the recogni
tion of the Confederacy, claiming that “ Jefferson Davis and
other leaders of the South have made an arm y; they are mak
ing, it appears, a n a vy; and they have made what is more than
either, they have made a nation." 79

Disraeli
The sugar question was a party issue.

If Corn was the

King of monopolies, Sugar was his Queen.

The Corn Laws

and the Sugar Duties were part of the same protectionist policy,
motivated by the desire to protect the poor soil of Britain and
the poor soil of the British West Indies from the competition
of the richer soil of other countries.

The aristocracy of the

sugar hogsheads joined hands with the aristocracy of corn.
Peel, free trader in cotton and silk, was protectionist in corn
and sugar.

The West Indian cause was ably championed by

the protectionists, Bentinck, Stanley, above all, Disraeli.
To Disraeli, equalization of the sugar duties was merely an
extension of protection to the slaveowners of Brazil and Cuba.
The abolition of slavery had ruined the West Indies.

It was

the greatest blunder ever committed by the English people,
“ an exciting topic . . . addressed to an insular people of strong
purpose, but very deficient information." 80

When the West

Indians bargained the protecting duty for Indian immigration,
Disraeli turned the batteries of his scorn on their leader,
“ mounted on a hogshead of sugar, in a white sheet, holding
the taper of penitence, and crying ‘ peccavi' ".81
Yet Disraeli condemned the suppression of the slave trade on
grounds of economy and as a questionable policy which in
volved Britain in difficulties in every court and in every
colony.82

The great betrayal was in sight.

In 1846 the West

78 I b i d . , CIX, 1162, March 19, 1850.
79 P. Guedalla,

G la d s to n e a n d P a lm e r s to n

(London, 1928), pp. 64-66.

80 Hansard, Third Series, XCVI, 132-133, Feb. 4, 1848.
81 I b i d . , LXXXVIII, 166, July 28, 1846.
82 I b i d . ,

XCVII, 994-996, March 24, 1848.
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Indies were still to him “ a fragment, but a fragment which I
value, of the colonial system of England.”83

But to the apostle

of imperialism in the seventies, the wretched colonies were, in
the fifties, millstones round Britain’s neck.

“ After the im

mense revolution that has been carried into effect, we cannot
cling to the rags and tatters of a protective system.” 84

Mer

cantilism was not dead but damned.

Palmerston
What, then, of Palmerston, the “ last candle of the nine
teenth century ” ? The slave trade has been called Palmerston’s

“ benevolent crotchet ” .

In office he accomplished little.

Out

of office he goaded the government to greater efforts to ac
complish what he had failed to do.

A simple motion for

returns of the slave trade between 1815 and 1843 was accom
panied by a speech which fills over twenty-five columns in
Hansard, a rhetorical display crowned by a magnificent per
oration, which might have been culled
speeches of the last half-century.85

from

anti-slavery

As if he was appealing to

Parliament and the country for full appreciation of his labors
in the cause, once every month he drew attention to those
labors.86

But when Manchester’s representative emphasized

the difficulties which Britain’s suppression policy was causing
with the Brazilian government and deprecated armed inter
ference, Palmerston spoke about France, Cuba, the Imaum of
Muscat, everything but the Brazilian slave trade.87
In Palmerston’s eyes the distinction between free-grown
sugar and slave-grown sugar was irreconcilable to common
sense, untenable in practice, founded upon the principle of
protection 88 which he opposed as “ a principle . . .

of fatal

injury to the country and inimical to the prosperity of every
83 Hansard, Third Series, LXXXVIII, 164, July 28, 1846.
84

Ibid .,

85 Ibid.,

CXXIV, 1036, March 3, 1853.
LXXVI,

947, 963,

Peel, July 16, 1844.

88Ibid., LXXX, 482, Peel, May 16, 1845.

M Ibid.,
88Ibid.,

LXXXII, 1058-1064, July 24, 1845.
LXXV, 1068,

Ju n e

17, 1844.
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country to whose affairs it may be applied.” 89

He wished to

see the word “ protection ” erased from every commercial dic
tionary.90

They had given proof, he thought, of their zeal

for the suppression of the slave trade, and if they prohibited
the importation of Brazilian sugar, Brazil would think that
they did not really believe that free labor was cheaper than
slave.91

By their “ absurd tariff and mischievous policy ” the

government had “ sacrificed the commercial interests of the
country in the Brazilian trade, in the Spanish trade, and I
fear, also in other quarters about to follow, and all for the
purpose of maintaining a favorite crotchet, based upon hypo
critical pretences.” 92
*

*

*

*

In 1857 the London Times wrote with reference to the cotton
trade of the Southern states : “ it is our trade.
staple of British industry.

It is the great

We are Mr. Legree’s agents for

the manufacture and sale of his cotton crops.” 93
had come full circle.

The wheel

British capitalism had fostered West

Indian slavery and destroyed West Indian slavery— all in the
interests of British capitalism.

But it continued to thrive on

Brazilian, Cuban and American slavery.
E

r ic

H oward U niversity

89 I b i d . , CXI, 592, May 31, 1850.
90 Guedalla,

o p . c it .,

p. 30.

91 Hansard, Third Series, LVIII, 648, 653, May 18, 1841.
* * I b id .,

L X X X II,

550, 552,

93 T i m e s , Jan. 30, 1857.
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